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RECENT CASES
COPYRIGHT - EXCLUSIVE RIGHT To PERFORM COPYRIGHTED
WORKS PUBLICLY FOR PROFIT NOT INFRINGED BY RADIO EN-
TERTAINMENT OF RESTAURANT PATRONS. Twentieth Century
Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975).
In Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken' the United States
Supreme Court held that a restaurant owner who entertained patrons
by playing radio broadcasts of copyrighted songs did not infringe
copyright holders' exclusive rights to perform the works publicly for
profit.2 Defendant operated a "fast service" restaurant in Pittsburgh.
In the ceiling of his restaurant he had installed several loudspeakers
and connected them to a master radio set. Each morning he turned
the radio on and let it play for the rest of the business day without
editing any of the programming. Defendant's purpose in playing this
music was to entertain guests, some of whom consumed their meals
on the premises, and to increase employee efficiency. On the day in
question two copyrighted songs were broadcast by a local FM station,
which was licensed by the copyright holders' to perform their works.
The songs were received in Aiken's restaurant and carried over the
loudspeaker system to his patrons.
The copyright holders and the assignees of their public perform-
ance rights sued Aiken. The district court held that defendant's acts
constituted a public performance for profit, rendering him liable for
copyright infringement.' The court of appeals reversed 5 and certior-
1. 422 U.S. 151 (1975).
2. The Constitution gives Congress power to promote the arts by "securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This power was imple-
mented by the Copyright Act of 1909, Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075.
'Performers can obtain exclusive rights "[t]o perform the copyrighted work publicly for
profit if it be a musical composition .... ." 17 U.S.C. § l(e) (1970).
3. The broadcaster was licensed by the American Society of Composers, Au-
thors and Publishers (ASCAP) under a written agreement that specified that nothing
contained therein should "be construed . . . as authorizing any receiver of any radio
broadcast to perform publicly or reproduce the same for profit, by any means, method
or process whatsoever." Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 153
n.1 (1975).
4. 356 F. Supp. 271, 274-75 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
5. 500 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1974).
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ari was granted.6 In its construction of statutory performance rights
the Supreme Court adopted the approach of recent community anten-
na television (CATV) cases 7 that focused on the question whether
defendant's function was more nearly analogous to that of a viewer
or that of a broadcaster. Defendants in both CATV decisions were
found to be functionally more akin to the former and, therefore, not
liable for infringement.' Implicitly rejected in Aiken' was the so-
called "quantitative" test of previously controlling hotel radio cases
that had considered the extent of defendant's involvement in bring-
ing about the hearing of the copyrighted works. 10
For nearly forty years the law of entrepreneurial use of copy-
righted broadcasts had appeared settled. In 1931 the Supreme
Court unanimously decided in Buck v. Jewell LaSalle Realty Co."
that a hotel proprietor who played copyrighted radio tunes in the
public rooms of his hotel had "performed" the works and was liable
for copyright infringement. Employing what has since been de-
scribed as a quantitative test of performance,' a the Court emphasized
the extent of defendant's contribution in bringing about the recep-
tion. 2 Justice Brandeis, writing for the Court, struck down defendant's
arguments seriatim. First, defendant argued that licensing of broad-
casters exhausted all monopolies conferred by the Copyright Act.
13
The Court disagreed, noting that a monopoly is expressly granted
for all performances.1 4  Second, defendant asserted that only one
6. 419 U.S. 1067 (1974).
7. Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, 415 U.S. 394 (1974); Fortnightly Corp. v.
United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
8. 415 U.S. at 403-05; 392 U.S. at 398-401.
9. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975).
10. Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191 (1931); Society of Eur.
Stage Authors & Composers, Inc. v. New York Hotel Statler Co., 19 F. Supp. 1
(S.D.N.Y. 1937); see note 26 and accompanying text infra.
11. 283 U.S. 191 (1931).
11a. Although the Jewell-LaSalle Court did not use the term "quantitative," its
approach has since been so described in Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, 415 U.S. 394,
407-08 (1974); see Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 377 F.2d
872, 877 (2d Cir. 1967).
12. The question was certified to the Supreme Court as follows:
Do the acts of a hotel proprietor, in making available to his guests, through
the instrumentality of a radio receiving set and loud speakers installed in
his hotel and under his control and for the entertainment of his guests, the
hearing of a copyrighted musical composition which has been broadcast from
a radio transmitting station, constitute a performance of such composition
within the meaning of 17 USC Sec. 1(e)?
Id. at 195-96. This question was answered in the affirmative. Id. at 202.
13. 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
14. 283 U.S. at 197.
"performance" of each "rendition" was possible. The Court found
nothing in the Act, however, to support this argument. 15 Last,
defendant-hotelier contended that its acts were not a performance
because it had no control of programming and could not render a
particular composition at will. The Court answered that intent to
perform is not essential' 6 and that the hotelier assumed the risk of
infringement by operating the radio.' 7 Six years later in Society of
European Stage Authors and Composers, Inc. v. New York Hotel
Statler Co.'" the rule of Jewell-LaSalle was applied to a hotel with
radio speakers in private rooms. The proprietors argued unsuccess-
fully that no performance had occurred because the speakers
were guest-controlled,' 9 that the performance was not public because
it was heard only in private rooms,20 and that it was not for profit
since there was no separate charge for radio use.2' Thus, as long as
the precedent of Jewell-LaSalle and Statler remained unchallenged,
innkeepers who played radios for their patrons were as liable for
infringement of copyrighted works as concert hall owners who en-
gaged entertainers.
22
In 1968 the Court took a new look at its construction of section
l(e) of the Copyright Act.23 In Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists
Television, Inc.2 14 it held that a CATV corporation did not "perform"
the programs it transmitted. The Court employed a functional test,
considering Fortnightly's role more closely akin to that of a viewer
than that of a broadcaster. A simple dichotomy was stated: "Broad-
casters perform. Viewers do not. .... -25 Pointing out that vendors,
lessors, and manufacturers of televisions would be copyright infring-
ers if a pure quantitative test were used, the Court denounced that
approach.2 6 The functional, viewer-broadcaster analysis developed in
15. Id. at 197-98. A "rendition" may be live or broadcast.
16. Id. at 198; cf. Buck v. Duncan, 32 F.2d 366, 367 (W.D. Mo. 1929).
17. 283 U.S. at 198-99.
18. 19 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
19. The court rejected this argument as based on the theory that only the last
step counts. Id. at 4.
20. The court observed that a hotel is a "place of public accommodation" and
that the "guest personnel . . . always constitutes a small cross-section of the public."
Id. at 5; see Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. American Auto. Accessories Co., 5 F.2d
411, 412 (6th Cir. 1925).
21. The court found the hotel's "intramural broadcasting" to be one of the con-
siderations given to guests for the rental of rooms. 19 F. Supp. at 5.
22. See Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66 (1939); Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S.
591 (1917); Jerome H. Remiok & Co. v. General Elec. Co., 16 F.2d 829 (S.D.N.Y.
1926); M. Witmark & Sons v. L. Bamberger & Co., 291 F. 776 (D.N.J. 1923); Harms
v. Cohen, 279 F. 276 (E.D. Pa. 1922). See also Annot., 14 A.L.R. Fed. 825, 836-
39 (1973).
23. 17 U.S.C. § 1 (e) (1970).
24. 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
25. Id. at 398. For a general discussion of CATV systems see United States
v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 161-64 (1968).
26. 392 U.S. at 397; see notes 10, 12 and accompanying text supra.
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Fortnightly was reaffirmed in Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS,27 an
infringement suit against a CATV corporation that originated pro-
grams, sold commercials, and interconnected with other CATV sys-
tems to obtain distant programming. 28 Teleprompter removed any
doubt that the quantitative test was defunct, although Jewell-LaSalle
was not explicitly overruled.
29
In Twentieth Century Music Corp. V. Aiken"° the Court rea-
soned that "[i]f Fortnightly with its elaborate CATV plant and
Teleprompter with its even more sophisticated and extended techno-
logical and programming facilities were not 'performing,' then logic
dictates that no 'performance' resulted when [Aiken] merely activat-
ed his restaurant radio."31  Several public policy considerations sup-
port this result. First, a contrary decision could lead to payment of
several royalties for a single rendition of a work-far more protection
of copyright owners than necessary. 2  Second, a restaurateur would
be unable to avoid reception of works copyrighted by persons other
than his licenser, should he obtain a license. 3  Third, the Copyright
Act's avowed purpose of stimulating creativity 4 must be balanced
against the public's right to free use of creative works.3 5 Last, desig-
nation of the point in the rendition-broadcast-reception process at
which royalties are exacted is essentially an arbitrary matter. 36  In a
functional analysis, therefore, restaurant owners like Aiken can be
27. 415 U.S. 394 (1974).
28. The Court's remark in Fortnightly that "while we speak in this opinion
generally of CATV, we necessarily do so with reference to the facts of this case,"
392 U.S. at 399 n.25, led many to believe that Fortnightly was limited to CATV
transmission of local programming. This mistaken belief was put to rest by Tele-
prompter.
29. See note 44 and accompanying text infra.
30. 422 U.S. 151 (1975).
31. Id. at 161-62, quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 500 F.2d
127, 137 (3d Cir. 1974).
32. 422 U.S. at 163; see note 15 and accompanying text supra.
33. Id. at 162.
34. Id. at 156; see H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 7 (1909).
35. See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 393-
95 (1968).
36. One view is that "the owner of a copyright .. . should have the chance
to gather royalties whilst and where he may." Society of Eur. Stage Authors & Com-
posers, Inc. v. New York Hotel Statler Co., 19 F. Supp. 1, 6 (S.D.N.Y. 1937). A
major licensing agency, BMI, advocates allowing a copyright holder to "seek his roy-
alties at the point where the gross receipts and profits from the use of his work will
occur." Hearings on H.R. 4347, 5680, 6831, 6835 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 8, pt. 1, at 205 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings]. The American Hotel and Motel Association favors
"clearance at the source," i.e., licensing of broadcasters alone. Id. pt. 3, at 1882.
placed in the listener category just as arbitrarily as in the performer
category.
7
Unfortunately, the Court did not announce in Aiken that its
decision was based on public policy. Instead the Court sought to
justify the result on theoretical grounds. Its logic, however, is unper-
suasive. First, the Court's emphasis, in light of intervening techno-
logical change, on the "basic purpose" of the obsolescent statute
38
is less than unimpeachable-Jewell-LaSalle and Fortnightly applied
the same principle of construction with opposite results.3 9 Second,
although the functional test of Fortnightly was adopted in Aiken as
an analytical device intrinsically superior to the Jewell-LaSalle
quantitative test,40 the Court's earlier reversal of the court of appeals
holding in Teleprompter that a CATV operator was "functionally
equivalent" to a broadcaster 4 indicated that the functional test is sus-
ceptible to arbitrary application. Third, while the Court defended
its decision by alluding to the "inequitable and unenforceable" na-
ture of a contrary ruling,42 it failed to explain why a compromise
decision, which might have achieved a more equitable balance
among competing interests, was inappropriate.4 3  Fourth, despite
the serious roadblock to the Aiken result presented by Jewell-La-
Salle, the latter case was not overruled, but merely limited in an am-
biguous manner. 44  Last, the Court rather simplistically rested its
37. See, e.g., Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, 415 U.S. 394, 408 (1974).
38. 422 U.S. at 156.
39. Compare Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S.
390, 396 (1968), with Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 196-97
(1931).
40. 422 U.S. at 161-62; see notes 7-9, 12, 25-29 and accompanying text supra.
41. CBS v. Teleprompter Corp., 476 F.2d 338, 349 (2d Cir. 1973).
42. 422 U.S. at 162.
43. In Fortnightly the Solicitor General suggested that an "implied-in-law li-
cense" be found for some uses to accommodate competing considerations of copy-
right, communications and antitrust policy. 392 U.S. at 401 n.32. Others have rec-
ommended an economic analysis. See Gold, Television Broadcasting and Copyright
Law: The Community Antenna Television Controversy, in 16 COPYRIGHT LAW SYM-
POSIUM 170, 184-92 (1968). The Court did not discuss the interests of background
music companies nor Muzak's contention that the Aiken decision would "in signifi-
cant measure influence the price the public pays for background music whatever the
source." See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 500 F.2d 127, 129 (3d Cir.
1974). See also id., 356 F. Supp. 271, 273 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
44. The majority's observation in Fortnightly that Jewell-LaSalle "must be un-
derstood as limited to its own facts," 392 U.S. at 396 n.18, led Justice Fortas to de-
duce that the latter had been implicitly overruled. Id. at 407-08. Indeed, Tele-
prompter did not cite Jewell-LaSalle. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken,
500 F.2d 127, 136 n.21 (3d Cir. 1974). The Aiken majority, however, breathed new
life into the decision by assuming "for present purposes that . . . Jewell-LaSalle . . .
retains authoritative force in a factual situation like that in which it arose." 422 U.S.
at 160. The Court explained that the decision "might be supported by a concept akin
to that of contributory infringement ....... Id. at 160 n.11.
In Jewell-LaSalle the broadcaster had not been licensed by the copyright holders
and was joined as a defendant. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the Court
was referring to the unlicensed broadcaster when it spoke of the factual situation of
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holding on analogy to the CATV decisions.4 5
Relief from the inconsistencies of the A iken decision may be
provided by legislative action. Congressional hearings on possible
improvements of the Copyright Act have been underway for over ten
years.46 A National Commission on New Technological Uses of
Copyrighted Works has been established to review the copyright law
and recommend revisions. 47  The Register of Copyrights has es-
poused an exemption from liability for incidental entertainment of
small public audiences by unedited reception on ordinary radio or
television apparatus.48 The United States Senate in 1974 passed a
bill for general revision of the Act.49 The reintroduced version of
this bill5 defines the words "perform" and "publicly" 51 and the
Jewell-LaSalle. The Jewell-LaSalle Court, however, did not reach the question of the
effect upon others of a broadcaster's paying a license fee. 283 U.S. at 198. One
might speculate, then, that the Aiken Court was referring to other facts of Jewell-
LaSalle as well, such as the type of establishment or number of speakers. Justice
Blackmun was "discomforted" by the Court's "extracting and discovering great sig-
nificance in the fact that the broadcaster in Jewell-LaSalle was not licensed .... "
422 U.S. at 167 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The Chief Justice called the Court's
stance a "dubious process of limitation." Id. at 169 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
45. The Aiken district court felt that consistency in treatment of CATV and
radio was "not necessarily the just or only solution." Twentieth Century Music
Corp. v. Aiken, 356 F. Supp. 271, 275 (W.D. Pa. 1973). Justice Blackmun noted
that British law distinguishes "use of a radio in a public place [fromi 'the causing
of a work or other subject matter to be transmitted to subscribers to a diffusion serv-
ice.'" 422 U.S. at 166 (Blackmun, J., concurrring). The dissenters noted that "it is
not at all clear that the analysis of [the CATV] cases supports the result here." Id.
at 169 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see Dreher, Community Antenna Television and
Copyright Legislation, in 17 COPYRIGHT LAW SYMPOSiuM 102 (1969); Nester, Is
CATV Infringing Proprietary Rights in Television Broadcasts?, in 15 COPYIGHT
LAW SYMPosIUM 153, 167 (1967). See generally M. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT §§ 102,
134 (1974).
46. See Hearings, supra note 36.
47. See Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, 88 Stat. 1873.
48. Hearings, supra note 36, pt. 1, at 603. The Senate Committee on the Ju-
diciary has attempted to distinguish the use of "ordinary radios" from situations
"where broadcasts are transmitted to substantial audiences by means of loudspeakers
covering a wide area." S. 1361, S. REP. No. 983, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 130 (1974).
The licensing agencies opposed this immunity, basing their argument on the unfore-
seeable changes new inventions could bring. Hearings, supra note 36, pt. 1, at 205,
221-22; pt. 2, at 1029, 1056.
49. S. 1361, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); see 120 CONG. REc. 16,167-84 (daily
ed. Sept. 9, 1974). See also S. REP. No. 1035, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
50. S. 22, H.R. 2223, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). Further hearings were held
in the summer of 1975, but disagreement still exists on such issues as photocopying,
rights of educators, and CATV. See Eitlin, Report of the President of the Copyright
Society of the U.S.A., 1974-1975, 22 BULL. CR. Soc. 305, 306-08 (1975); S. REP.
No. 94-473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
51. To "perform" a work includes "to make the sounds accompanying it audi-
ble." "Publicly" means "at a place open to the public or at any place where a sub-
stantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social ac-
phrase "exclusive rights." More importantly, an exemption from lia-
bility is provided for
communication of a transmission embodying a performance
or display of a work by the public reception of the transmission
on a single receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in
private homes, unless:
(A) a direct charge is made to see or hear the trans-
sission; or
(B) the transmission thus received is further transmitted
to the public.5
2
Taken alone, this exemption appears to protect restaurateurs
like Aiken, but in defining the term "transmit" the revised Act may
reincorporate the very ambiguity at the heart of the Aiken litigation.
"To 'transmit' a performance . . . is to communicate it by any
device or process whereby images or sounds are received beyond
the place from which they are sent."5  Depending on the courts'
construction of the word "place" in this definition, a restaurant owner
who "communicates" music from a receiver in his office to speakers
in the dining room may be guilty of infringement.
In Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken the Court decided
that restaurateurs who play radio broadcasts of copyrighted songs for
the enjoyment of their patrons are not liable for infringement. 54 The
door appears open, therefore, to free use of broadcast works by
entrepreneurs operating home-type radios. Yet, the impact of Aiken
is unclear. Justice Blackmun's assertion that the holding "abrogates
more than 40 years of established business practices" is technically
correct, but exaggerates the case's importance in view of the recording
industry's history of inattention to minor infringements.55  If the
Court had desired to overrule Jewell-LaSalle, it might have done so
directly.56 Instead the Court allowed that decision to stand, limited
quaintances is gathered." "To perform a work publicly" includes transmission to a
public group "by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public
. . . receive [the performance] in the same place or in separate places and at the
same time or at different times." S. 22, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1975).
52. Id. § 110(5).
53. Id. § 101.
54. The Aiken decision may not extend to cases in which (1) the broadcaster
is unlicensed, (2) privity exists between the receiver and the broadcaster, or (3) the
broadcaster's license fails to explicitly exclude implied license of receivers. See note
44 supra.
55. 422 U.S. at 166 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see Twentieth Century Music
Corp. v. Aiken, 356 F. Supp. 271, 274 n.4 (W.D. Pa. 1973). The Fortnightly ma-
jority claimed that the Jewell-LaSalle rule had not been applied in practice. 392 U.S.
at 401 n.30. The Aiken Court noted that to its knowledge ASCAP had not tried
to license single-speaker concerns. According to ASCAP, however, a large number
of concerns like Aiken's have been licensed. 422 U.S. at 162 n.12; Twentieth Century
Music Corp. v. Aiken, 356 F. Supp. 271, 273 (W.D. Pa. 1973). A review of the
many decisions citing Jewell-LaSalle disclosed no factually similar cases.
56. Justice Blackmun suggested that "we should be realistic and forthright and,
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vaguely to its facts. In the future this uncertainty may be construed
as a design to establish one rule for hotels and another for restaurants
or to make the receiver's liability turn on the broadcaster's license.
Certainly, factual settings exist after Aiken in which a restau-
rant's reception of copyrighted songs will constitute infringement.57
Perhaps one of these will be litigated and lead to the limitation or
overruling of Aiken. Congress could do much to clarify the matter
through the pending Copyright Act revision, but this revision may
concentrate on other areas of current concern and leave the Aiken
rule unmodified.5" Until Congress expressly exempts or includes
restaurateurs in the Act's liability sections, the issues addressed in
Aiken will remain unsettled. The dubious reasoning of that decision
renders it ripe for future judicial scrutiny and makes blind reliance
on its shield a risky course.
INSURANCE-PENNSYLVANIA'S No-FAULT ACT UPHELD UNDER
STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS. Singer v. Sheppard,
-Pa.-, 346 A.2d 897 (1975).
Pennsylvania's new No-fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act1 al-
lows accident victims to recover certain enumerated losses without
regard to fault while partially abolishing their common-law rights of
recovery in tort. The general assembly considered partial abolition of
tort liability essential to the maintenance of a reasonable rating struc-
ture under the Act because of the relatively high limits placed on
elements of basic loss. 2  Section 301(a),8 governing tort liability,
if Jewell-LaSalle is in the way, overrule it." 422 U.S. at 167 (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring); see note 44 and accompanying text supra.
57. See note 50 supra. See generally B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF
COPYRIGHT 105-06, 127-28 (1967).
58. See, e.g., note 54 supra.
[Casenote by Donald A. Nolte.]
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1009.101-.701 (Supp. 1975).
Other states have similar statutes: E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.730-.741
(1972); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 294-1 to -41 (Supp. 1974); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§
24.13101-.13179 (Supp. 1975). Some no-fault statutes do not restrict tort liability:
E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-4014 to -4021 (Supp. 1973); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A,
§§ 538-46 (Supp. 1975).
2. Under the basic loss provisions of the Act, expenses for reasonable medical,
vocational, and emergency expenses are paid without limit. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40,
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2. Under the basic loss provisions of the Act, expenses for reasonable medical,
vocational, and emergency expenses are paid without limit. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40,
therefore, was made expressly inseverable from the remainder of the
Act.4 Because a constitutional defect in that section would invalidate
the entire Act, it was inevitably the primary target for opponents of
the no-fault system. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's recent
decision in Singer v. Sheppard,5 holding that section 301(a) violates
neither article III, section 18 of the Pennsylvania constitution nor the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment,6 thus has elimi-
nated the most serious threat to the constitutionality of no-fault in
Pennsylvania.
7
Article III, section 18 of the Pennsylvania constitution prohibits
the enactment of laws limiting the amount of damages that can be
recovered in actions for personal injuries. Its original enactment in
18748 marked a reaction to certain special interest legislation
that prescribed maximum dollar recoveries permitted in negligence
actions against common carriers.9 In 1915 the section was amended
to permit enactment of compulsory workmen's compensation plans."0
In Singer plaintiff contended that the No-fault Act's partial
abolition of tort recovery for general, noneconomic damages violated
the express prohibition of article III, section 18 by limiting the
amount of damages recoverable for personal injuries. Plaintiff's
arguments were twofold. First, injuries embodied in the concept of
pain and suffering remain legally cognizable in a no-fault system1
because the Act still permits a victim to recover for pain and suffering
§§ 1009.103, 1009.202(a) (Supp. 1975). Limits are set, however, on other elements
of basic loss: funeral expense-$1,500; work loss-15,000; replacement services
loss-$25/day up to one year; survivors loss-$5,000. Id. Section 1009.103 defines
"allowable expense," § 1009.202 sets out basic loss benefits.
3. Id. § 1009.301(a).
4. Id. § 1009.503.
5. - Pa. -, 346 A.2d 897 (1975).
6. Id. at -, 346 A.2d at 907.
7. Two members of the court, Chief Justice Jones and Justice Pomeroy, also
considered whether partial abolition of tort liability violated Pennsylvania's constitu-
tional requirement, PA. CONST. art. I, § 11, of access to the courts for redress of in-
juries. Singer v. Sheppard, -Pa. -, -, 346 A.2d 897, 902-04 (1975).
8. PA. CONST. art. III, § 21 (1874).
9. Act of April 4, 1868, P.L. 58, No. 26.
10. The pertinent portion of article III, § 18 reads as follows:
The General Assembly may enact laws requiring the payment by em-
ployers . . . of reasonable compensation for injuries to employes . . . re-
gardless of fault of employer or employe, and fixing the basis of ascertain-
ment of such compensation and the maximum and minimum limits thereof
• . . but in no other cases shall the General Assembly limit the amount to
be recovered for injuries. . . to persons. ...
PA. CONST. art. III, § 18 (emphasis added).
11. The General Assembly has not totally abolished a cause of action in
the No-fault Act . . . nor has it even attempted such an abolition. Thus,
Section 301 (a) by its title at best attempts a 'partial abolition' of tort liabil-
ity but the same section includes five separate references that the individual
remain liable for a full measure of common law damages . . . and thereby
incorporates by reference the entire body of Pennsylvania tort law as it
presently exists. . . . mhe substantive standards of tort liability have not
even partially been affected. . ..
Brief for Plaintiff at 22-23, Singer v. Sheppard, - Pa. -, 346 A.2d 897 (1975).
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if he meets one of the threshold requirements of section 301(a)(5).
12
For example, a victim still can sue in tort if he has incurred medical
expenses over seven hundred fifty dollars or suffered severe cosmetic
disfigurement.'" Although section 301(a)(5) does not expressly
create maximum dollar limitations on personal injury recoveries, it
effectively reaches this unconstitutional result by denying some vic-
tims the right to recover for pain and suffering and, thus, prohibiting
a full recovery for their injuries. Plaintiff's second argument was that
the express language of article III, section 18" required a finding
that the no-fault medical threshold limited the amount recoverable.
The constitutional language implies that compulsory workmen's
compensation laws would unconstitutionally limit the amount recov-
erable for injuries but for the specific exemption contained in the
1915 amendment. 15 Because of the close analogy between work-
men's compensation and no-fault automobile insurance plans,' 6 a
12. Section 301(a)(5) provides,
Tort liability is abolished with respect to any injury that takes place
in this State in accordance with the provisions of this act, if such injury
arises out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, except that:
(5) A person remains liable for damages for non-economic detriment if the
accident results in
(A) death or serious and permanent injury; or
(B) the reasonable value of reasonable and necessary medical and
dental services. . . is in excess of $750; or
(C) medically determinable physical or mental impairment which pre-
vents the victim from performing all or substantially all of the
material acts and duties which constitute his usual and customary
daily activities and which continues for more than 60 consecutive
days; or
(D) injury which in whole or in part consists of cosmetic disfigure-
ment which is permanent, irreparable and severe.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 301(a) (5) (Supp. 1975).
13. ld. §301(a)(5)(B), (D).
14. PA. CONST. art. III, § 18 (quoted, supra note 10).
15. This proposition has not been tested in Pennsylvania since the Workmen's
Compensation Act, Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, No. 338, was held constitutional
as a voluntary relationship between employer and employee prior to the 1915 amend-
ment of the constitutional provision. Andrews v. Carnegie Steel Co., 255 Pa. 33,
40, 99 A. 215, 217 (1916). Under current law an employee, at least theoretically,
may request not to be covered by workmen's compensation. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77,
§ 461 (1952). In dicta, however, the supreme court has stated that without article
III, § 18 (formerly § 21) and agreement of the parties, the limited recovery in work-
men's compensation cases would be invalid. Dolan v. Linton's Lunch, 397 Pa. 114,
124, 152 A.2d 887, 893 (1959). "Workmen's Compensation, because it limits the
amount recoverable by employees of negligent employers ... , required constitutional
authority." Fishel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 6 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 384, 386, 295
A.2d 345, 346 (1972) (emphasis added); Tropiano v. Travelers Ins. Co., 455 Pa.
360, 362, 319 A.2d 426, 427 (1974); DeJesus v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 439 Pa. 180,
184, 268 A.2d 924, 926 (1970).
16. In discussing this analogy one author wrote,
similar constitutional amendment was said to be a prerequisite to the
elimination of tort liability in section 301 (a) (5).",
Notwithstanding plaintiffs reasoning the majority of the court
held that section 301(a) was valid because it abolished the right to
recover in tort rather than limited the amount recoverable.18  The
implicit premise of this distinction is that section 301(a)(5) creates a
classification of accident victims based on their ability to recover in
tort. For those victims unable to meet the statutory threshold there
exists no cause of action and, therefore, no legally recognized inju-
ry.19 In the absence of a legal injury2° no unconstitutional limitation
of the amount of damages is possible. By deciding the case in this
manner, the court did not have to consider directly the merits of
plaintiff's interpretation of article III, section 18.
The Singer opinion provides the first judicial construction of
article III, Section 18.21 The court indicated that as a general rule
partial abolition of a right to recover for certain types of injuries will
not violate this constitutional provision. It noted that while the items
of compensable damage that a potential plaintiff is permitted to
recover may differ, the types of damage compensable for each class of
victims have no maximum limit. When each class "remains free to
recover without limit for the types of injuries assigned to each, there is
no violation of article III, section 18. "122 Thus, the provision has
Both [workmen's compensation and no-fault insurance plans] are con-
cerned with the prompt payment without regard to fault of at least a por-
tion of the costs of injuries received. Both assess these costs through the
medium of some sort of insurance plan, on one who may not be at fault;
both limit the recovery available.
Cowen, Due Process, Equal Protection and No-fault Allocation of the Costs of Auto-
mobile Accidents, in CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS IN AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COM-
PENSATION REFORM 29 (U.S. Dep't of Transp., Auto Ins. & Compensation Study
1970); see Martel, No-Fault Automobile Insurance in Pennsylvania-A Constitu-
tional Analysis, 17 VILL. L. REV. 783, 809 n.133 (1972).
17. The Pennsylvania No-fault Act is distinguishable from any workmen's com-
pensation plan. The latter imposes a maximum amount that may be recovered for
pain and suffering while the former does not limit recovery once the threshold has
been crossed.
18. Singer v. Sheppard, - Pa. , , 346 A.2d 897, 902 (1975). Plaintiff
conceded that the general assembly has power to abrogate a cause of action. Brief for
Plaintiff at 22, Singer v. Sheppard, - Pa. -, 346 A.2d 897 (1975), citing McMullen
v. Nannah, 49 Pa. D. & C. 516 (C.P. Beaver 1943) (upholding act abolishing cause
of action for alienation of affections and breach of promise to marry).
19. In writing the majority opinion Chief Justice Jones actually considered the
legal injury requirement in conjunction with the article I, § 11 issue that two of the
majority thought was improperly raised on appeal. - Pa. at -, 346 A.2d at 903-
04.
20. See Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 263 Pa. 158, 106 A. 238 (1919), af 'd,
260 U.S. 22 (1922) (for purposes of PA. CONST. art. I, § 11, "injury" means legally
recognized injury).
21. See Martel, No-Fault Automobile Insurance in Pennsylvania-A Constitu-
tional Analysis, 17 VILL. L. REV. 783, 816-19 (1972).
22. Singer v. Sheppard, - Pa. -, -, 346 A.2d 897, 902 (1975). Justice Nix
explained the article III, § 18 issue in this manner:
Recent Cases
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
been narrowly construed to prohibit only the imposition of maximum
dollar recoveries similar to the 1868 legislation that limited negli-
gence recoveries against common carriers.2"
This aspect of the court's decision created important equal pro-
tection implications since the Act does not abolish the cause of action
in tort for all accident victims. The court recognized that the exist-
ence of a constitutionally significant classification of accident victims
based on their ability or inability to recover required further analysis
in light of the fourteenth amendment.24 Under the rational relation
test enunciated in this case, statutory classifications must be sustained
unless they are patently arbitrary and bear no rational relation to
legitimate governmental objectives.2"
The first step in applying the rational relation test to particular
classifications is to ascertain the legislative objectives. The Pennsyl-
vania No-fault Act was designed to "establish at reasonable cost to
the purchaser of insurance, a State wide system of prompt and
It is clear . . . that the legislature recognized the desirability of elim-
inating the common law cause of action for pain and suffering. . . . It is
equally apparent that the legislature also determined the need for a right
of recovery for selected classes of individuals. The mere fact that these two
objectives were achieved in the same piece of legislation does not justify the
conclusion .. . that this is merely a limitation of a right of recovery which
is prohibited under Article III, Section 18.
Id. at -, 346 A.2d at 913 (concurring opinion).
23. Act of April 4, 1868, P.L. 58, No. 26; see note 9 and accompanying text
supra.
24. See generally Bishop, The Validity Under the Constitution of the United
States of Basic Protection Insurance, in CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS IN AUTOMOBILE
ACCIDENT COMPENSATION REFORM (U.S. Dep't of Transp., Auto. Ins. & Compensa-
tion Study 1970).
25. Singer v. Sheppard, - Pa. -, -, 346 A.2d 897, 904-05 (1975), citing
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683 (1973). Various formulations of the ra-
tional relation test have been stated by the courts. For example, in McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), it was explained that
[t]he Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment permits the States a
wide scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of citi-
zens differently than others. The constitutional safeguard is offended only
if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the state's objective.
State legislatures are presumed to have enacted within their constitutional
power despite that in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statu-
tory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may
be conceived to justify it.
Id. at 425 (emphasis added). In Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415
(1920), the Court declared that a classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and
must rest on some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the
objective of the legislation.
Plaintiff in Singer argued that the tests above were different and that the latter
one, which he contended was more restrictive, was applicable in the instant case.
Brief for Plaintiff at 25-26, Singer v. Sheppard, - Pa. -, 346 A.2d 897 (1975).
adequate basic loss benefits for motor accident victims." 6  Another
purpose was to eliminate minor claims for pain and suffering that
could undermine the effectiveness of the entire system by raising
consumer costs to a prohibitively high level. 7 Although it has been
contested effectively in at least one case, 28 the reduction of congestion
in the courts has been cited as a third fundamental goal of no-fault
legislation. 9
In Singer the equal protection discussion focused on the classifi-
cation of accident victims according to their ability to recover non-
economic damages under the threshold provisions of the Act." The
court held that to the extent expensive litigation was eliminated for
legislatively determined minor accidents, the express purpose of main-
taining reasonably priced insurance coverage was advanced. Al-
though the actual line of demarcation, the seven hundred fifty dollar
threshold, has arbitrary aspects, the "establishment of boundaries" is
a proper legislative function and will not be overturned when a
reasonable basis for the classification exists.3 '
Plaintiff also contended that other provisions of section 301(a)
made tort recovery dependent upon arbitrary and unreasonable
classifications. Thus, while tort remedies are generally unavailable to
automobile and bus passengers, they are available to motorcycle32 and
26. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.102(b) (Supp. 1975).
27. R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE ACCIDENT VICTIM
492 (1965).
28. In Montgomery v. Daniels, 81 Misc. 2d 373, 367 N.Y.S.2d 419, 423 (Sup.
Ct. 1975), rev'd, (Ct. App., Nov. 25, 1975), the court held that statistical evidence
introduced by plaintiff effectively rebutted the congested court purpose by showing
that the fault-based tort system has not been a source of this problem.
29. E.g., R. KEETON & J. O'CoNNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE ACCIDENT
VICTIM 492 (1965). These authors stated, "[I]n view of the overwhelming number
of traffic cases choking the claims system . . . it makes sense for the legislature to
treat small ones differently from large ones." Id.
30. Equal protection attacks on the threshold provisions of statutes in other
states generally have met with little success. E.g., Manzanares v. Bell, 214 Kan. 589,
522 P.2d 1291 (1974) (threshold is reasonably related to proper police power purpose
of insuring prompt and equitable treatment); Opinion of the Justices, 113 N.H. 205,
304 A.2d 881 (1973); Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1, 271 N.E.2d 592 (1971) (vari-
ous thresholds upheld, including fracture and $500 medical, because of need for an
easily determined, objective rule).
31. Singer v. Sheppard, - Pa. -, -, 346 A.2d 897, 913 (1975) (Nix, J., con-
curring), citing Goodman v. Kennedy, -Pa. -, -, 329 A.2d 224, 230 (1974); see
Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974) (slight geographical variation
in price of medical services not irrational). But see Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296
So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974) (fracture to weight-bearing bone held an arbitrary threshold);
Manzanares v. Bell, 214 Kan. 589, 522 P.2d 1291 (1974) (fracture to weight-bear-
ing bone held an arbitrary threshold).
32. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009,301(a) (6) (Supp. 1975). Many states elim-
inated motorcycles from their no-fault provisions by excluding them from classifica-
tion as a motor vehicle. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.732(1) (1972); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 39:6(a)-2(a) (1973); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31-4-3 (Supp. 1974). Pennsyl-
vania defines motor vehicles to include motorcycles, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §
1009.103 (motor vehicle) (Supp. 1975); id. tit. 75, § 401(a) (1971); id. § 102
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trolley passengers.33 Similarly, recovery is permitted if the accident
involves an uninsured vehicle 4 or if injuries are intentionally inflict-
ed. 35 Finally, tort recovery is permitted in products liability cases.
In upholding these provisions the court noted that legislation does
not have to correct a social problem in its entirety. Different remedies
may be required and reform can proceed one step at a time. There-
fore, it is permissible for the legislature to fashion a remedy that does
not correct all aspects of a problem, provided it is not so arbitrary that
constitutionally protected rights are violated.
37
Despite the controversy surrounding the enactment of the
Pennsylvania No-fault Act, the court's decision in Singer was amply
supported by logic, history, and precedent. Singer's import will
extend beyond no-fault because it provides the first definitive analysis
of article Il, section 18 of the Pennsylvania constitution. By deciding
that the Act does not deny equal protection to automobile accident
victims, the court has concurred with the majority of other state
courts that have considered the question. Since a rational basis exists
for the classificational schemes embodied in the No-fault Act, its
operation is not so arbitrary that the fourteenth amendment is violat-
ed.
(Supp. 1975), but excludes motorcycle occupants from basic loss benefits. Id. tit.
40, § 1009.103 (basic loss benefits) (Supp. 1975). The reason for defining motor
vehicle to include motorcycles is to require motorcycle owners to provide partial se-
curity in the form of liability insurance and basic loss benefits for noninsured
victims other than occupants of the motorcycle. See id. §§ 1009.103 (basic loss ben-
efit), (victim), 1009.204(a), 1009.301; 5 PA. BULL. 445 (March 8, 1975). See gen-
erally Shoemaker, Evolution of a No-Fault Dilemma: The Motorcycle, 22 DRAKE
L. REV. 750 (1973).
33. Trolleys are not considered motor vehicles because they are guided by a
track. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 102 (Supp. 1975); id. § 401(a) (1971).
34. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.301(a)(1) (Supp. 1975); see Lasky v. State
Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974) (compulsory insurance is permissible goal;
imposition of tort liability on uninsured motorists is proper inducement). Contra,
Gaines v. Mohawk Motor Inc., No. 74-005-575 N.I. (Cir. Ct. Wayne County, Mich.,
Aug. 1, 1974). Other provisions of the Pennsylvania act intended to induce motor-
ists to purchase insurance include criminal sanctions for operating an unsecured ve-
hicle, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.601 (Supp. 1975), and reimbursement require-
ments, id. § 1009.501; see id. §§ 1009.104(d), 1009.108(a)(4).
35. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.301(a)(3) (Supp. 1975); see Singer v. Shep-
pard, - Pa. -, -, 346 A.2d 897, 906 (1975).
36. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.301(a)(2) (Supp. 1975); see Singer v. Shep-
pard, - Pa. -, -, 346 A.2d 897, 906 (1975).
37. Singer v. Sheppard, - Pa. -, -, 346 A.2d 897, 907 (1975), citing Wil-
liamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
[Casenote by J. Michael Ewing].
TORTS - LIBEL AND SLANDER - DEFENDANT'S DEATH BEFORE
TRIAL DOES NOT TERMINATE LIBEL ACTION; DEFAMATION Ex-
CEPTION TO PENNSYLVANIA'S SURVIVAL STATUTE HELD VIOLA-
TIVE OF EQUAL PROTECTION. Moyer v. Phillips, - Pa. -, 341
A.2d 441 (1975).
The last vestiges of the common-law rule actio personalis mori-
tur cum persona were confronted recently by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania in Moyer v. Phillips.1 The court found that section
3371 of the Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code' authorizing sur-
vival of all causes of action upon the death of a defendant except libel
and slander, denied persons suffering legal injury to their reputations
equal protection of the laws.3
The action commenced when John Moyer filed a libel suit
against a physician who had administered him a physical examination
required by the Interstate Commerce Commission. The doctor's
report to plaintiff's employer stated that plaintiff was a chronic alco-
holic unfit to continue as a tractor-trailer driver. In his complaint
plaintiff alleged that the libel had deprived him of his employment
and other related benefits as well as his good name. After the suit
was filed but before trial, the defendant, Dr. Phillips, died. The trial
court dismissed plaintiffs cause of action pursuant to section 3371
of the Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code,4 holding that the
action abated upon defendant's death.5 The superior court affirmed
per curiam,6 but the supreme court granted allocatur to consider
plaintiff's constitutional arguments.
Although confusion surrounded the common-law distinction be-
tween survival of a cause of action upon the death of a party and
abatement of a pending suit because of a party's death,7 the statutory
1. - Pa. -, 341 A.2d 441 (1975). Essentially the rule provided that per-
sonal actions died with the person. Keite v. Boyd, 16 S. & R. 300 (Pa. 1827).
2. 20 PA.C.S. § 3371: "All causes of action or proceedings, real or personal,
except actions for slander or libel, shall survive the death of the plaintiff or of the
defendant, or the death of one or more joint plaintiffs or defendants."
3. The statute was found violative of both the federal and state constitutions.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; PA. CoNsT. art. III, § 32.
4. 20 PA.C.S. § 3371.
5. Moyer v. Phillips, 45 North. 75 (Pa. C.P. 1973).
6. Moyer v. Phillips, 228 Pa. Super. 746, 311 A.2d 334 (1973).
7. The death of either party to an action presents two distinct problems. The
first problem is whether the cause of action "survives." If the deceased individual
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rule was quite clear that causes of action for slander and libel termi-
nated upon the death of either party, regardless of whether or not the
action had been commenced." Although the common-law rule that
all personal actions died with the parties gradually was reversed by
statute, the Pennsylvania General Assembly repeatedly enacted excep-
tions for libel and slander,9 presumably on the theory that these
actions are quasi-criminal in nature and that punishment, rather than
compensation, was their objective.' °
The Moyer court's disagreement with this rationale formed the
basis of its decision. Chief Justice Jones, writing for the court, stated
that the purpose of the modern defamation action "above all [was]
compensation for and restoration of the victim's good name."" This
purpose is consistent with that of the survival statute, which is found-
ed on the modern theory of torts and generally is compensatory in
was a party to a pending action and the cause of action survives, the second problem
is whether the action "abates." Strictly speaking, it was to the former problem that
the maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona applied. See I AM. JUR. 2d Abate-
ment, Survival, and Revival § 47-53 (1962); 1 C.J.S. Abatement and Revival §§
114-16 (1936); 1 P.L.E. Abatement and Revival §§ 21-22 (1957); 2 STANDARD PENN-
SYLVANIA PRACTICE 23-27, 43 (Rev. ed. 1956).
Although early Pennsylvania statutes maintained the distinction, later legislative
enactments did not. Compare Act of April 13, 1791, 3 SM. L. 28, ch. 1575, § 8,
with Act of June 7, 1917, P.L. 447, No. 193, § 35(a).
8. Act of April 13, 1791, 3 SM. L. 28, ch. 1575, § 8 (implied; followed com-
mon law); Act of Feb. 24, 1834, P.L. 73, No. 52, § 28; Act of June 7, 1917, P.L.
447, No. 193, § 35(a); Act of April 18, 1949, P.L. 512, No. 121, § 601; Act of June
30, 1972, P.L. 508, No. 164, § 3371.
9. Id.
10. The common-law rule that personal actions died with the person was based
on the vindictive and quasi-criminal character of civil injury suits. Moyer v. Phillips,
- Pa. -, -, 341 A.2d 441, 442 (1975); F. POLLOCK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF TORTS 72 (Am. ed. 1894); cf. Evans, A Comparative Study of the Statutory Sur-
vival of Tort Claims For and Against Executors and Administrators, 29 MICH. L.
REV. 969, 986-87 (1931). Defendant's death prevented any punishment and, thus,
ended any reason for continuing the suit. If plaintiff died, any recovery by his estate
was barred as a windfall to his heirs. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 126, at 898 (4th ed. 1971); cf. Evans, supra at 986-87.
The common-law rule was viewed with disfavor by the judiciary who "carefully
avoided . . . extend[ing] this principle further than they [were] compelled to do,
by the adjudged cases." Means v. Presbyterian Church, 3 Pa. 93, 97 (1846); accord,
Nelson v. Gass, 21 Pa. Dist. 777 (C.P. Warren 1912). The result of this attitude
was the emergence of exceptions to the rule. E.g., Nagle v. Nagle, 16 Pa. D. & C.
346 (C.P. Erie 1931), aff'd, 316 Pa. 507, 175 A. 487 (1934) (libel in a will; abate-
ment rule held inapplicable); Struthers v. Peacock, 3 W.N.C. 517 (C.P. Phila. 1877)
(death of one plaintiff-partner; abatement rule held inapplicable). Both the judicial
attitude and the exceptions were to be expected in view of the compensatory trend
of modern tort law. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, 1 THE LAW OF TORTS xliii-xliv (1956);
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 4, at 22 (4th ed. 1971); 1 A. SEDo-
WICK, ELEMENTS OF DAMAGES §§ 29-30 (9th ed. 1912).
11. Moyer v. Phillips, -Pa. -,-, 341 A.2d 441,444 (1975).
nature. 12  Denying the right of survivorship to defamation actions,
thus, contradicted the goals of both the defamation action and the
survival statute. It prevented the victim's estate or the victim himself
from ever vindicating his good name and precluded the possibility of
compensation. Therefore, the court concluded that the statutory
distinction between those actions that survived the death of a party
and defamation actions, which did not, was an arbitrary classification
that failed to further any discernible legislative purpose.' 3
The facts presented by Moyer v. Phillips required only that the
court decide whether the statute was unconstitutional in the event
defendant died before trial. The court did not expressly extend its
holding to the circumstance of plaintiffs death before trial. Justice
Manderino in a concurring opinion1" stated that this result was
implicit in the majority's decision. Justice Roberts, however, disa-
greed:
This does not present any question regarding the constitu-
tionality of that portion of section 3371 which provides that an
action for slander or libel does not survive the death of the plain-
-tiff. That question would depend upon substantially different
considerations and I express no views as to its answer. To the
extent that the majority opinion may do so, it is, of course, mere
dictum. 15
Justice Roberts argued that the majority's decision was correct
only because of a recent, significant change in tort law that relieved
defamation defendants of a previously heavy burden of proof. Prior
to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc.,' 6 the focus of litigation in a defamation suit was the
affirmative defenses available-truth and privilege. Since the privi-
lege defense involved proof of defendant's state of mind, his death
severely hindered his estate in presenting that defense. Gertz held
that plaintiff must show defendant to have been at least negligent to
make out a prima facie case.' 7  According to Justice Roberts, this
12. Bums v. Goldberg, 210 F.2d 646 (3d Cir. 1954); Centofanti v. Pennsyl-
vania R.R., 244 Pa. 255, 90 A. 558 (1914); see note 10 supra.
13. - Pa. at -, 341 A.2d at 444-45. The court could discover no reason to
allow a plaintiff in an action other than defamation to continue his suit upon the
defendant's death, but to deny a defamation plaintiff the same right. Id. at -, 341
A.2d at 445; cf. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 126, at 901 (4th
ed. 1971).
14. Moyer v. Phillips, - Pa. -, -, 341 A.2d 441, 445 (1975) (Manderino,
J., concurring).
15. Id. at - n.2, 341 A.2d at 446 n.2 (Roberts, J., concurring). The dispute
centered around a recent decision of the court, Menefee v. CBS, 458 Pa. 46, 329
A.2d 216 (1974), that held an action in defamation abates on plaintiff's death. This
decision was not expressly overruled in the majority opinion and hence confusion
resulted.
16. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
17. Id. at 347. Specifically the Court ruled, "We hold that, so long as they
do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appro-
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requirement forces plaintiffs to prove facts "that would ordinarily
negate the existence of a conditional privilege" ' and as a practical
matter to prove the falsity of the defamatory statement. Thus, the
special burdens of defending a defamation action before Gertz had
justified the defamation exception to section 3371. Their demise in
that case, Justice Roberts reasoned, was a necessary prerequisite for
the majority's holding in Moyer.
Nevertheless, nothing in Justice Roberts' concurring opinion
indicates that a defamation action should terminate if plaintiff dies. 9
Indeed, the primary considerations of the majority, vindication of
plaintiffs good name and compensation for damages suffered, are
applicable whether or not plaintiff survives. As in other tort actions
included in the survival statute, these considerations may be very
important to a deceased plaintiff's family and creditors. Because the
Moyer court found the primary goal of the defamation action to be
compensation and not punishment, dismissal of a deceased plaintiff's
suit will serve no discernible legislative purpose. Furthermore, be-
cause a third party must always testify to establish publication of the
defamatory statement, plaintiffs estate will not have a significantly
greater burden of proof than plaintiff himself. Nor is defendant's
ability to defend the action, the critical element in Justice Roberts'
analysis of Gertz, significantly diminished by plaintiff's death since
the burden of proof now rests on the plaintiff. Consequently, when
the court is next faced with the issue of whether a defamation action
survives plaintiffs death, it is predictable that Moyer will be the auth-
ority for the court's affirmative answer. When that occurs, the last
vestige of the archaic rule actio personalis moritur cum persona will
have finally been erased.
priate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood in-
jurious to a private individual." Id. For an analysis of Gertz and its effect on state
law see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975).
.18. Moyer v. Phillips, - Pa. -, -, 341 A.2d 441, 447 (1975) (Roberts, J.,
concurring).
19. Although Justice Roberts hinted that considerations exist that support this
result, he chose not to discuss them. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
[Casenote by David E. Holland.]
CRIMINAL LAW-DRUG OFFENDERS-MANDATORY LIFE SEN-
TENCES FOR DRUG SELLERS HELD NOT CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT. People v. Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d 100, 332 N.E.2d
338, 371 N.Y.S.2d 471 (1975).
In People v. Broadie1 eight defendants separately appealed con-
victions for violating New York's drug laws.' Each argued that
classification of his offense as a class A felony3 and the mandatory
life sentence imposed by statute4 violated the eighth and fourteenth
amendments of the United States Constitution.' In a unanimous
opinion by Chief Justice Breitel the Court of Appeals affirmed the
convictions and held that the punishments imposed "were not grossly
disproportionate or cruel and unusual in the constitutional sense."6
The 1973 revisions of New York's drug statutes challenged in
Broadie represent an attempt to deal with the most severe drug
problem in the Nation,7 a problem that has survived repeated and
varied attempts at eradication.8 The principal revisions were a sub-
stantial upgrading of the severity of certain drug offenses9 and an
1. 37 N.Y.2d 100, 332 N.E.2d 338, 371 N.Y.S.2d 471 (1975).
2. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 220.06-.43 (McKinney Supp. 1974). The 1973 revi-
sions are summarized in Hechtman, Supplementary Practice Commentary, N.Y.
PENAL LAW art. 220 (McKinney Supp. 1974), at 6.
Six defendants were convicted of felonious street sales of cocaine or heroin.
Two were convicted of sales of one-eighth ounce or more of cocaine and possession
of one ounce or more of heroin.
3. New York divides felonies into five classes, A through E, in descending
order of severity. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.00 (McKinney 1975). See generally L.
PAPERNO & A. GOLDSTEIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN NEW YORK, PART I § 406
(1970).
4. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.00(2) (a) (McKinney 1975) reads,
2. Maximum term of sentence. The maximum term of an indeterminate
sentence shall be at least three years and the term shall be fixed as
follows:
(a) For a class A felony, the term shall be life imprisonment;
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.00(1) (McKinney 1975) requires indeterminate sentences in
all cases except some involving class D and E felonies.
5. The eighth amendment was held applicable to the states in Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
6. 37 N.Y.2d 100, 106, 332 N.E.2d 338, 347, 371 N.Y.S.2d 471, 482 (1975).
7. Over one-half of the drug addicts in the United States reside in New York
City. People v. Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d 100, 104, 332 N.E.2d 338, 345, 371 N.Y.S.2d
471, 480 (1975); Editorial, Another Crisis Pending?, 25 NAT. REV. 408 (1973).
8. Annual Message of the Governor, McKiNNEY's 1973 SESSION LAWS OF
NEW YORK, at 2317-19; Hechtman, Supplementary Practice Commentary, N.Y.
PENAL LAW art. 220 (McKinney Supp. 1974), at 6.
9. Compare N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.40 (McKinney 1967) with N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 220.43 (McKinney Supp. 1974), which upgrades criminal sale of a controlled
substance in the first degree from a class B to a class A felony.
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increase of the maximum punishment to mandatory life imprison-
ment. 10 Additional revisions eliminated conditional and unconditional
release," imposed lifetime parole' 2  and probation," eliminated
youthful offender treatment,' 4 severely restricted pleabargaining,' 5
and eliminated the possibility of civil commitment for treatment.' 6
Although the New York Court of Appeals had never struck
down a statutorily authorized punishment as unconstitutionally dis-
proportionate to the offense,' 7 the court had earlier recognized the
principle.' The eighth amendment was originally intended to prevent
the barbarities of early English criminal law, but has since evolved to
prohibit punishment grossly disproportionate to the offense.' 9 This
principle was first recognized in Justice Field's dissenting opinion in
O'Neil v. Vermont" and first applied in 1910 in Weems v. United
States.21 In the latter case the Supreme Court declared unconstitution-
al a sentence of fifteen years imprisonment in chains at hard labor,
loss of numerous civil rights, perpetual surveillance,22 and a fine for
the offense of falsifying Coast Guard records with intent to defraud
the United States. The Weems court declared that punishment must
10. See note 4 supra. The rationale for indeterminate sentences is that they
afford a prisoner an opportunity to minimize the term of his imprisonment by re-
habilitating himself to the point that the parole board trusts him to leave. People
v. Gardner, 78 Misc. 2d 744, 359 N.Y.S.2d 196 (Sup. Ct. Westchester 1974). An
indeterminate sentence extends to the maximum allowable period, subject ordinarily
to termination by a parole board or similar agency at any time after service of the
minimum sentence. People ex rel. Page v. Brophy, 248 App. Div. 309, 289 N.Y.S.
362 (4th Dept. 1936).
11. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 65.05(1)(a) (McKinney 1975).
12. N.Y. ComRuc. LAw § 212 (McKinney 1968). A grant of parole is an act
of legislative grace and its denial to certain offenders is well within the scope of legis-
lative discretion. Stewart v. United States, 325 F.2d 745 (8th Cir. 1964).
13. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.00(3) (McKinney 1975).
14. N.Y. CRmM. PRo. LAW § 720.10(2) (McKinney 1971).
15. N.Y. CUM. PRo. LAw § 220.10(6)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1974). Plea
bargaining under the 1973 revisions is possible only for determining the minimum
sentence and the plea must be guilty to no less than a class A felony. People v.
Venable, 46 App. Div. 2d 73, 361 N.Y.S.2d 398 (3d Dept. 1974).
16. N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 81.21(a)(3) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
New York has a comprehensive drug treatment program nevertheless. N.Y. MENTAL
HYGIENE LAw §§ 81.01-.38 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
17. 37 N.Y.2d 100, 102, 332 N.E.2d 338, 341, 371 N.Y.S.2d 471, 475 (1975).
18. People v. Davis, 33 N.Y.2d 221, 306 N.E.2d 787, 351 N.Y.S.2d 663
(1973).
19. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); People v. Mosely, 78 Misc. 2d 736,
258 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (Monroe County Ct. 1974).
20. 144 U.S. 323, 337 (1892).
21. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
22. Apparently this would have meant lifetime parole.
be graduated and proportioned to the offense23 without exceeding the
purposes of the punishment. 24 Furthermore, the Court noted that
what is a cruel and unusual punishment is a progressive concept
whose meaning will change with public opinion.
25
The Broadie court formulated four criteria for weighing the
constitutionality of a statutorily authorized punishment:26
The gravity of the offense in terms of its harm to society--On
this point the court spoke of the high correlation between narcotics
use and violent crime27 and rejected on the strength of this correla-
tion defendants' arguments that their crimes were not violent. A
similar argument had been rejected in People v. Gardner.2 s In that
case the court found that drug selling is but one phase of a large-
scale criminal activity
that springs from human greed and preys on man's weakness-
one that turns buyers into sellers, makes addicts out of new-
born infants and sets addicts to mugging, thievery, prostitution,
robbery and murder to support an insatiable appetite.29
The Broadie court also pointed to crimes committed by addicts to
support their habits"9 and the social harm resulting from drug addic-
tion,3 ' to which the dealer is a prime contributing factor.
The offender's character and the gravity of his threat to
society-The court noted that each defendant's case involved sales of
23. 217 U.S. at 366; see Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786 (4th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 408 U.S. 942 (1971).
24. 217 U.S. at 381. See also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 279 (1972)
(Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 330-32 (Marshall, J., concurring).
25. 217 U.S. at 378; see Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Ralph v. Warden,
438 F.2d 786 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 942 (1971); Goss v. Bomar,
337 F.2d 341 (6th Cir. 1964); Gallego v. United States, 276 F.2d 914 (9th Cir.
1960); State v. White, 254 La. 389, 223 So. 2d 843 (1969).
26. In People v. Venable, 46 App. Div. 2d 73, 361 N.Y.S.2d 398 (3d Dept.
1974), essentially the same test was applied with the same result. A contrary deci-
sion is People v. Mosley, 78 Misc. 2d 736, 358 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (Monroe County Ct.
1974). The rationale of Mosley was attacked and rejected in People v. Hollings-
worth, 79 Misc. 2d 468, 360 N.Y.S.2d 765 (Albany County Ct. 1974).
27. See generally Greenberg & Adler, Crime and Addiction: An Empirical
Analysis of the Literature, 1900-1973, 3 CONTEMP. DRUG PROB. 221 (1975); Mc-
Donald, A Judge Looks at Drug Addiction, 7 TRIAL 16 (May-June 1971).
28. 78 Misc. 2d 744, 359 N.Y.S.2d 196 (Sup. Ct. Westchester 1974).
29. Id. at 750, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 202.
30. It has been estimated that to finance a $10,000 per year habit, an addict
must steal or otherwise acquire $50,000 worth of goods because "fences" do not pay
true value. Cazalas, Addiction in the United States: A Medical-Legal History, 18
LOYOLA L. REV. 1 (1972). Another estimate is that an addict must steal ten times
the cost of his habit. McDonald, A Judge Looks at Drug Addiction, 7 TRIAL 16
(May-June 1971).
31. In People v. Hollingsworth, 79 Misc. 2d 468, 469, 360 N.Y.S.2d 765, 767
(Albany County Ct. 1974), the court stated,
One does not have to look very far to find the broken lives caused by drug
abuse nor does one have to possess the logical ability of an Einstein to
perceive the causal connection between rampant drug abuse in this State
and Country and a major percentage of the number of crimes of violence,




heroin or cocaine or possession of large amounts of these drugs.3 2 A
possessor of large amounts of narcotics, therefore, was said to be
presumptively a seller33 whom the legislature could reasonably treat
as a grave threat to society. 34 This threat remains even if a particular
defendant is not a hardened criminal.35
The penological purpose of the legislature-The court recog-
nized that while rehabilitation is one aim of penal sanctions,3 6 it has
not been successful with drug offenders. 7 Therefore, the legislature's
shift in emphasis to deterrence and isolation was held reasonable3 s
and, because of the severity of the offense, appropriate.39
Comparisons with punishments authorized for other offenses
and for similar offenses in other jurisdictions-In New York only
murder in the first degree, for which capital punishment is author-
ized, 40 and arson in the first degree,4 kidnapping in the first de-
gree, 41 and murder in the second degree,43 which are punishable by
mandatory maximum life sentences,4 4 are punished as severely as
drug offenses.4 Even persistent felony offenders are free from man-
datory maximum life sentences except in special circumstances.46
Two additional points unrelated to drugs buttressed the court's
decision. First, the court held that defendants had failed to overcome
32. 37 N.Y.2d 100, 100-01, 332 N.E.2d 338, 341, 371 N.Y.S.2d 471, 474
(1975).
33. Id.
34. In People v. Junco, 43 App. Div. 2d 266, 351 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1st Dept. 1974),
the court quoted Judge McQuillan, the sentencing judge: "Nothing is more destruc-
tive to a community's well being than widespread drug abuse. More young people
in our city die from drug abuse than from any other single cause. Hard drugs are
indeed a cancer to our community." Id. at 268, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 3; see People v.
Gardner, 78 Misc. 2d 744, 359 N.Y.S.2d 196 (Sup. Ct. Westchester 1974).
35. Courts have recognized that high-volume dealers often recruit younger ad-
dicts without criminal records because as first offenders the latter ordinarily will re-
ceive lighter sentences. Stewart v. United States, 325 F.2d 745 (8th Cir. 1964).
36. See People v. Mosley, 78 Misc. 2d 736, 358 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (Monroe
County Ct. 1974).
37. See generally Annual Message of the Governor, MCKINNEY'S 1973 SESSION
LAWS OF NEW YORK, at 2317-19.
38. See generally N. MORRIS & G. HAWKINs, THE HONEST POLITICIAN'S GUIDE
TO CRIME CONTROL 253-55 (1969); P. TAPPAN, CONTEMPORARY CORRECTION 4-13
(1951).
39. People v. Junco, 43 App. Div. 2d 266, 351 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1st Dept. 1974).
40. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 60.06, 125.27 (McKinney 1975).
41. Id. § 150.20 (causing an explosion in an occupied building).
42. Id. § 135.25.
43. Id. § 125.25.
44. Id. § 70.00.
45. See generally People v. Mosley, 78 Misc. 2d 736, 358 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (Mon-
roe County Ct. 1974).
46. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.10 (McKinney 1975).
the strong presumption that a statute is constitutional 7 and that the
legislature has investigated and found facts necessary to support its
actions.4" Second, the court felt obliged by separation of powers
concepts to exercise restraint.49 It refused, therefore, to substitute its
judgment for that of the legislature or even to comment on it.50 This
restraint conformed to the principle that subject only to constitutional
limitations, it is a legislative function to determine the seriousness of
an offense 5 and set the parameters of allowable punishment.52
No other state punishes drug sellers so severely,53 but no
other state has a drug problem comparable to that of New York.54 The
court concluded,
Compared both 'internally', to punishments for other crimes
under the [New York] Penal Law, and 'externally', to punish-
ments imposed elsewhere for the same or similar offenses, the
narcotics laws are relatively severe, but not irrationally so, given
the epidemic dimensions of the problem. 55
This rationale indicates that Broadie is not opening the door to
drastically increased punishments for all offenses. Furthermore, it will
not provide precedent for other states attempting to enact similar
47. People v. Pagnotta, 25 N.Y.2d 333, 253 N.E.2d 197, 305 N.Y.S.2d 484
(1969) (unconstitutionality must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt); Wasmuth
v. Allen, 14 N.Y.2d 391, 200 N.E.2d 756, 252 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1964); I.L.F.Y., Co.
v. Temporary State Housing Rent Comm'n, 10 N.Y.2d 263, 176 N.E.2d 822, 219
N.Y.S.2d 249 (1961).
48. People v. Venable, 46 App. Div. 2d 73, 361 N.Y.S.2d 398 (3d Dept. 1974);
People v. Broadie, 45 App. Div. 2d 649, 360 N.Y.S.2d 906 (2d Dept. 1974); People
v. Weiss, 78 Misc. 2d 792, 358 N.Y.S.2d 267 (Suffolk County Ct. 1974).
49. 37 N.Y.2d 100, 105, 332 N.E.2d 338, 346, 371 N.Y.S.2d 471, 481 (1975).
50. [Dlisagreement as between the Courts and the State Legislature as
to the best way to deal with convicted drug sellers is not enough to war-
rant declaring a State statute unconstitutional. The principle that the ju-
diciary may not substitute its judgment and discretion for the judgment of
the Legislature is so well entrenched in our law that it almost needs no
citation.
People v. Hollingsworth, 79 Misc. 2d 468, 360 N.Y.S.2d 765, 766 (Albany County
Ct. 1974).
51. Save as limited by constitutional provisions safeguarding individual
rights, a State may choose means to protect itself and its people against
criminal violation of its laws. The comparative gravity of criminal of-
fenses and whether their consequences are more or less injurious are
matters for its determination.
Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937); see Gallego v. United
States, 276 F.2d 914 (9th Cir. 1960).
52. People v. Broadie, 45 App. Div. 2d 649, 360 N.Y.S.2d 906 (2d Dept.
1974). In contrast, imposition of sentence within the statutory limits is ordinarily
a matter of judicial discretion by the trial court. People v. Dittmar, 41 App. Div.
2d 788, 341 N.Y.S.2d 50 (3d Dept. 1973).
53. 37 N.Y.2d 100, 104, 332 N.E.2d 338, 345, 371 N.Y.S.2d 471, 480 (1975).
In In re Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910, 519 P.2d 1073, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1975), a
defendant convicted of five counts of heroin sale was sentenced to ten years to life
without possibility of parole for ten years. Without the prohibition against parole
he would have been eligible after serving one-third of his minimum sentence. The
court struck down the parole prohibition as violative of California's constitutional
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6.
54. See note 7 and accompanying text supra.




legislation. The decision required a drastic social disorder and New
York's drug epidemic is unique.
It is still too early to decide what effects, if any, the revisions of
New York's drug statutes will have on drug trafficking and addic-
tion. 56 "In our present-day society, the punishment fits the offense
and the offender. When the epidemic has passed, it will be time to
consider amendments. 57
56. It remains to be seen if Broadie will be used as a precedent in cases chal-
lenging the Supreme Court's ruling in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). A
basis for the decision of Justices Stewart and White to declare the death penalty un-
constitutional was its arbitrary application. In People v. McNair, 78 Misc. 2d 341,
356 N.Y.S.2d 205 (Sup. Ct. Monroe 1974), the court upheld the same statutes chal-
lenged in Broadie and argued that the mandatory penalties prescribed were not arbi-
trary and, thus, were not cruel and unusual under the Furman rationale.
57. People v. Venable, 46 App. Div. 2d 73, 79, 361 N.Y.S.2d 398, 407 (3d
Dept. 1974).
[Casenote by Larry I. Haft.]

